News Center. I added paragraph numbers at the left margin, converted the
text encoding from Unicode (UTF-8) to US-ASCII, and reformatted to reduce the file
size from 27 kilobytes to 5 kilobytes while accurately preserving all
of Annan's text.
Following the failure of the Geneva negotiations in February 2014, and
the failure of the Moscow consultations in April 2015, Annan's words in
¶9 are still relevant in April 2015 and for the foreseeable future.
Kofi Annan's resignation speech
2 Aug 2012
Opening remarks by Kofi Annan,
2 August 2012 — [¶1] Five months ago, I was asked to take on the role of Joint Special Envoy for Syria, in order to seek a peaceful solution to the crisis, an end to the killings of civilians, the human rights abuses, and a path towards a political transition.
Joint Special Envoy for Syria,
at press conference — Geneva
[¶2] I accepted this task, which some called "Mission Impossible" — for I believed it was a sacred duty to do whatever was in my power to help the Syrian people find a peaceful solution to this bloody conflict.
[¶3] The severity of the humanitarian costs of the conflict, and the exceptional threats posed by this crisis to international peace and security, justified the attempts to secure a peaceful transition to a political settlement, however daunting the challenge.
[¶4] The increasing militarization on the ground and the clear lack of unity in the Security Council, have fundamentally changed the circumstances for the effective exercise of my role.
[¶5] Yet the bloodshed continues, most of all because of the Syrian government’s intransigence, and continuing refusal to implement the six-point plan, and also because of the escalating military campaign of the opposition — all of which is compounded by the disunity of the international community.
[¶6] At a time when we need — when the Syrian people desperately need action — there continues to be finger-pointing and name-calling in the Security Council.
[¶7] The Geneva Communiqué, endorsed by the Action Group for Syria on 30 June , provided an international agreement on a framework for a political transition. This should have been automatically endorsed by the Security Council and something the international community should have built on.
[¶8] Without serious, purposeful and united international pressure, including from the powers of the region, it is impossible for me, or anyone, to compel the Syrian government in the first place, and also the opposition, to take the steps necessary to begin a political process.
[¶9] You have to understand: as an Envoy, I can’t want peace more than the protagonists, more than the Security Council or the international community for that matter.
[¶10] I have therefore informed the Secretary-General of the UN and Secretary-General of the Arab League today that I do not intend to continue my mission when my mandate expires at the end of August .
[¶11] My central concern, from the start — and I think I mentioned it to you — has been the welfare of the Syrian people. Syria can still be saved from the worst calamity — if the international community can show the courage and leadership necessary to compromise on their partial interests for the sake of the Syrian people — for the men, women and children who have already suffered far too much.
[¶12] I would like to extend my appreciation and gratitude to both the Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon and Secretary-General ElAraby of the Arab League for their unflinching support and the grace and cordiality that they extended to me, having given me the opportunity to serve the cause of peace once again.
[¶13] I will now take your questions.
This document is at
created 18 April 2015
my list of
to historical documents on the Syrian civil war.